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Abstract: In mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes do not rely on any routing infrastructure
but relay packets for each other. Thus communication in mobile ad-hoc networks
functions properly only if the participating nodes cooperate in routing and forwarding.
However, it may be advantageous for individual nodes not to cooperate, for example
to save power or to launch security attacks such as denial-of-service. In this paper,
we give an overview of potential vulnerabilities and requirements of mobile ad-hoc
networks, and of proposed prevention, detection and reaction mechanisms to thwart
attacks.
1 Introduction
In order to customize security and cooperation solutions for the requirements of various
types of mobile ad-hoc networks, we make the following distinctions.
Closed vs. open world assumption. Mobile ad-hoc networks can be either managed by
an organization that enforces access control or they can be open to any participant that is
located closely enough.
Prevention vs. detection and reaction mechanisms. According to Schneier [Sch00], a
prevention-only strategy will only work if the prevention mechanisms are perfect; other-
wise, someone will find out how to get around them. Most of the attacks and vulnerabilities
have been the result of bypassing prevention mechanisms. In view of this reality, detection
and response are essential. In this paper we present proposals representing all of these
classes.
Malicious vs. selfish behavior. As there is no infrastructure in mobile ad-hoc networks,
the nodes have to cooperate in order to communicate. Intentional non-cooperation is
mainly caused by two types of nodes: selfish ones that, e.g., want to save power, and
malicious nodes that are not primarily concerned with power saving but that are interested
in attacking the network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state the problem,
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followed by a brief overview of current solution proposals for either prevention or detec-
tion/reaction mechanisms in Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4.
2 Security and Cooperation Issues in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
Mobile ad-hoc networks have properties that increase their vulnerability to attacks. Un-
reliable wireless links are vulnerable to jamming and by their inherent broadcast nature
facilitate eavesdropping. Constraints in bandwidth, computing power, and battery
power in mobile devices can lead to application-specific trade-offs between security and
resource consumption of the device. Mobility/Dynamics make it hard to detect behavior
anomalies such as advertising bogus routes, because routes in this environment change
frequently. Self-organization is a key property of ad-hoc networks. They cannot rely on
central authorities and infrastructures, e.g. for key management. Latency is inherently
increased in wireless multi-hop networks, rendering message exchange for security more
expensive. Multiple paths are likely to be available. This property offers an advantage
over infrastructure-based local area networks that can be exploited by diversity coding.
Besides authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, access control, and non-
repudiation being harder to enforce because of the properties of mobile ad-hoc networks,
there are also additional requirements such as location confidentiality, cooperation fair-
ness and the absence of traffic diversion.
The lack of infrastructure and of an organizational environment of mobile ad-hoc net-
works offers special opportunities to attackers. Without proper security, it is possible to
gain various advantages by malicious behavior: better service than cooperating nodes,
monetary benefits by exploiting incentive measures or trading confidential information;
saving power by selfish behavior; preventing someone else from getting proper service,
extracting data to get confidential information, and so on.
Routes should be advertised and set up adhering to the routing protocol chosen and should
truthfully reflect the knowledge of the topology of the network. By diverting the traf-
fic towards or away from a node, incorrect forwarding, no forwarding at all, or other
non-cooperative behavior, nodes can attack the network. Several routing and forwarding
attacks have been described, e.g., in [BB01] and [HPJ01].
3 An Overview of Proposed Solutions
3.1 Prevention Mechanisms
Authentication by ‘imprinting’. Stajano and Anderson [SA99] authenticate users by
‘imprinting’ in analogy to ducklings acknowledging the first moving subject they see as
their mother, but enable the devices to be imprinted several times. Imprinting is realized
by accepting a symmetric encryption key from the first device that sends such a key. They
neither address routing nor forwarding, however, user authentication and authorization are
an important prerequisite for trust in the network layer also in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Asynchronous threshold security has been employed by Zhou and Haas [ZH99] together
with share refreshing for distributed certification authorities for key management in mobile
ad-hoc networks. They take advantage of inherent redundancies in such networks due
to multiple routes to enable diversity coding, allowing for Byzantine failures given by
several corrupted nodes or collusions. This approach potentially is a strong prevention
mechanism, however, to the best of our knowledge, the impact on the network and the
security performance remain to be investigated.
Incentives to cooperate have been proposed by Buttya´n and Hubaux [BH00] in the form
of so-called nuglets that serve as a per-hop payment in every packet or in the form of
counters [BH01] to encourage forwarding. Both nuglets and counters reside in a secure
module in each node, are incremented when nodes forward for others and decremented
when they send packets for themselves. One of their findings is that, given such a module,
increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the entire network but also for individual
nodes.
Self-organized PGP by using chains of certificates has been developed by Hubaux, Buttya´n
and Capcun [HBC01]. Several certificate paths can be found by sharing information of
nodes that each keep a small part of the certification knowledge, a prerequisite being the
assumption that trust is transitive.
Localized certification based on the public key infrastructure (PKI) with certification-
authority and secret-share update functionalities distributed among neighbors have been
suggested by Kong, Zerfos, Luo, Lu and Zhang [KZL   01]. For threshold secret-sharing
and certification nodes need K one-hop neighbors within a given time window. The nodes
locally store the system certification revocation list. A simulation showed a good success
ratio and tolerable delay.
SRP, the Secure Routing Protocol by Papadimitratos and Haas [PH02], guarantees correct
route discovery, so that fabricated, compromised, or replayed route replies are rejected or
never reach the route requester. SRP assumes a security association between end-points of
a path only, so intermediate nodes do not have to be trusted for the route discovery. This is
achieved by requiring that the request along with a unique random query indentifier reach
the destination, where a route reply is constructed and a message authentication code is
computed over the path and returned to the source. The correctness of the protocol is
proven analytically.
ARIADNE, a secure on-demand routing protocol by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [HPJ01],
prevents attackers from tampering with uncompromised routes consisting of uncompro-
mised nodes. It is based on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and relies on symmetric
cryptography only. It uses a key management protocol called TESLA that relies on syn-
chronized clocks. Simulations have shown that the performance is close to DSR without
optimizations.
SEAD, Secure Efficient Distance vector routing for mobile ad-hoc networks by Hu, John-
son and Perrig [HJP02] is based on the design of destination-sequenced distance-vector
routing (DSDV) and uses one-way hash functions to prevent uncoordinated attackers from
creating incorrect routing state in another node. Performance evaluation has shown that
SEAD outperforms DSDV-SQ in terms of packet delivery ratio, but SEAD adds overhead
and latency to the network.
3.2 Detection and Reaction
Intrusion detection for wireless ad-hoc networks has been proposed by Zhang and Lee
[ZL00] to complement intrusion-prevention techniques. The authors argue that an ar-
chitecture for intrusion detection should be distributed and cooperative, using statistical
anomaly-detection approaches and integrating intrusion-detection information from sev-
eral networking layers. They use a majority voting mechanism to classify behavior by
consensus. Responses include re-authentication or isolation of compromised nodes. De-
tection rates and performance penalties remain to be investigated.
Watchdog and pathrater components to mitigate routing misbehavior have been pro-
posed by Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [MGLB00]. They observed increased throughput
in mobile ad-hoc networks by complementing DSR with a watchdog for detection of de-
nied packet forwarding and a pathrater for trust management and routing policy rating
every path used, which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes in their routes as a reac-
tion. Although this reaction does not punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate and
actually relieves them of the burden of forwarding for others while having their messages
forwarded, it allows nodes to use better paths and thus to increase their throughput.
CONFIDANT (see our papers [BB01], [BB02a], [BB02b]) stands for ‘Cooperation Of
Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks’ and it detects malicious nodes by means
of observation or reports about several types of attacks and thus allows nodes to route
around misbehaved nodes and to isolate them from the network. Nodes have a monitor for
observations, reputation records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observations, trust
records to control trust given to received warnings, and a path manager for nodes to adapt
their behavior according to reputation. Simulations for “no forwarding” have shown that
CONFIDANT can cope well even with half of the network population acting maliciously.
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed by Michiardi and Molva [MM02],
also has a watchdog component; however it is complemented by a sophisticated reputa-
tion mechanism that differentiates between subjective reputation (observations), indirect
reputation (positive reports by others), and functional reputation (task-specific behavior),
which are weighted for a combined reputation value that is used to make decisions about
cooperation or gradual isolation of a node. Reputation values are obtained by regarding
nodes as requesters and providers, and comparing the expected result to the actually ob-
tained result of a request. A performance analysis by simulation is stated for future work.
4 Conclusion
Mobile ad-hoc networks are vulnerable to attacks that differ from those in fixed networks;
their properties pose additional requirements to security and cooperation protocols. There
are many open research challenges, because by definition mobile ad-hoc networks are
self-organized and have no infrastructure and central authorities. Examples for research
questions are self-organized key management, cooperation incentives, group-membership
and access control, authentication and identity persistence, and trust management.
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